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Book Reviews 
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDI-
CATION. By Harry H. Wellington.! New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press. 1990. Pp xii, 196. Cloth, $22.50. 
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION. By Laurence H. 
Tribe2 and Michael C. Dorf.3 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1991. Pp. 144. Cloth, $18.95. 
Larry Alexander4 
These two books have several things in common. They are 
both short. They are both authored by well-known constitutional 
theorists. They both deal with constitutional interpretation. They 
are both moderate in tone, striking a balance between apology and 
criticism with respect to the Supreme Court's performance, and set-
ting forth very middle-of-the-road-among-academics prescriptions 
for constitutional jurisprudence. And they are both book-form ren-
ditions of arguments that the authors have floated in other writings. 
There are also some major differences between the books. Wel-
lington's is written for a general, though educated, audience, and 
perhaps for students of constitutional law in disciplines other than 
law. Tribe and Dorf's is written largely for academics, as it is noth-
ing more than the repackaging of two quite academic pieces: 
Tribe's 1988 Tanner Lecture,s and Tribe and Dorf's 1990 article in 
the University of Chicago Law Review.6 Their styles are different. 
Wellington's is nonrigorous and somewhat rambling, with a 
number of threads that are picked up but left hanging. He fre-
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quently appears to be merely reporting noncontroversial facts about 
constitutionalism and judicial review rather than, as is the case, tak-
ing vigorously mooted positions on issues. Tribe and Dorf's style is 
much tighter and more clearly focused, though they deal with only 
part of the realm of issues that Wellington engages. The critical, 
prescriptive nature of their book is never hidden beneath an appar-
ently descriptive facade. 
Although Wellington's central prescription for constitutional 
adjudication-courts should look to "public morality," as well as to 
"language, precedent, structure, and history" -differs from Tribe 
and Dorf's prescription of "interpolation and extrapolation," the 
prescriptions have a common element. Both deal with the relation-
ship between the facticity of the Constitution and of judicial prece-
dents-that these are specific texts that are the datable products of 
identifiable human beings speaking a particular language and acting 
with a congery of specific purposes-and those politicaVmoral prin-
ciples that we believe should guide the relationship between gover-
nors and governed. Both books urge judges to look both to fact and 
to value, to is and to ought, to the positive historical Constitution 
with its judicial accretions and to morality. And in the final analy-
sis, though reflecting on these books may help us see this central 
problem of constitutional jurisprudence-indeed, of law generally-
more clearly, neither book, in my opinion, brings us closer to a 
solution. 
Wellington begins his book with a discussion of judicial review 
and the countermajoritarian difficulty. There is much here that 
Wellington's intended general audience will find useful, though aca-
demics will have heard it all many times before. Wellington's gen-
eral points are: legislation in pursuance of the constitutional design 
is not itself perfectly majoritarian (because of the Senate, geographi-
cal representation, unaccountable lame duck presidents, lobbying 
and collective choice problems, etc.); the very Constitution that 
prescribes the forms of popular sovereignty also places substantive 
as well as procedural limits on legislation; the legislature cannot be 
trusted to determine the constitutionality of its own enactments; ju-
dicial review is less problematic than legislative review; and judicial 
interpretation of statutes, which is accepted by everyone, can be 
functionally just as "final" in terms of thwarting the popular will as 
judicial review for constitutionality. Although Wellington's argu-
ment moves much too quickly to satisfy any serious constitutional 
theorist, he does present to the general public a cogent case on be-
half of judicial review. 
As Wellington turns from the case for judicial review to his 
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own position on constitutional interpretation, the quality of his ar-
guments declines. He begins with rather tired arguments against 
original intent and representation-reinforcement as interpretive 
strategies. What is particularly disappointing here is Wellington's 
failure to acknowledge that we cannot even identify the Constitu-
tion itself-the text-much less that it is written in English, without 
making some assumptions about someone's intentions. What atti-
tude would we hold toward that piece of parchment if we discov-
ered that it was the product of a thousand monkeys spilling ink? 
We cannot dispense with intentions in interpretation. Therefore, 
the question is not whether intentions, but which ones? 
After repudiating original intent and representation-reinforce-
ment as interpretive sources, Wellington turns to his own proposal, 
namely, that judges should look to public morality in interpretation. 
Wellington calls this the common-law method of adjudication, and 
he prescribes it for adjudication under statutes and the Constitution 
as well. 
The public morality approach to constitutional (or any) adjudi-
cation leads to several fundamental problems that Wellington either 
does not address or does not adequately resolve. Public morality is 
not the sole source of constitutional law for Wellington; rather, it is 
to be combined with the other sources of "language, precedent, 
structure, and history." How does one combine such disparate ele-
ments and justify the conclusion one reaches in terms of that combi-
nation? Wellington tells us only that the adversary system, dialogue 
among judges, and written opinions will produce justifiable consti-
tutional interpretation. This is really thin gruel, especially if you 
suspect that "combining" these elements is like "combining" pi, 
green, and the Civil War. 
What is this "public morality" that is to be combined with lan-
guage, precedent, structure, and history? Wellington is clear that it 
is positive public morality rather than the judge's view of correct 
morality. But can a judge keep her own moral views separate from 
her views of public morality, given that she inevitably will believe 
the former are nothing more than the latter purged of such impuri-
ties as faulty logic, factual errors, and failures of empathy and 
imagination? 
Wellington wants to deny that public morality is the same 
thing as the moral views of the judges, but he offers no method for 
discerning and proving its content. Moreover, by coming down on 
the side of positive public morality rather than true morality, he 
makes this source of constitutional law timebound in a way that 
leads him to conclude, for example, that Griswold v. Connecticut 
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was correctly decided in 1965 but should perhaps have been decided 
differently had it arisen in 1879. The reason for this temporal varia-
bility in the meaning of "liberty" under the due process clause is not 
that facts about marriage changed significantly between 1879 and 
1965, and not that Connecticut's interest in prohibiting contracep-
tion was greater in 1879 than in 1965. The only change between 
1879 and 1965 that justifies a difference in outcome is that public 
morality supported Connecticut's legislation in 1879 but not in 1965 
(notwithstanding failure to repeal). 
The final chapters of Wellington's book consist of rather desul-
tory treatment of such issues as stare decisis in constitutional law, 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation and article Ill, executive and legis-
lative disregards of judicial decisions that misconstrue public moral-
ity, and the mechanisms for dialogue about public morality among 
the courts, the legislatures, the academic critics, and the general 
public. This portion of the book is even less rigorous and less thor-
oughly argued than the previous portions. 
Tribe and Dorf's book has two parts corresponding to the two 
previously published works on which it is based. The first part 
deals with constitution.'!} interpretation generally. Tribe and Dorf 
reject the Raoul Berger brand of reliance on original intent, point-
ing out the all-too-familiar litany of problems with such an ap-
proach (whose intent? at what level of generality? and why 
authoritative?) and arguing that only the text of the Constitution is 
law. (Of course, can the text be a text, and one in English, without 
reference to someone's intentions? If not, then to whose intentions? 
And why limit ourselves to their linguistic intentions and not look 
to their normative intentions as well?7) But although Tribe and 
Dorf view only the constitutional text as authoritative, they do not 
espouse some wooden textualist approach to interpretation. 
Rather, they would look to the purposes behind the text in constru-
ing it. (Original intentions start to creep back in here, don't they?) 
The chief interpretive sins that Tribe and Dorf identify here, apart 
from Berger-type originalism, are textual disintegration and hyper-
integration. The former refers to reading specific parts of the Con-
stitution in isolation from the rest of the document and the general 
purposes and values that inform it. The latter refers to the opposite 
error of looking only to the general purposes and values and disre-
garding the specific ways the text prescribes for their implementa-
tion. Tribe and Dorf are surely correct that disintegration (or 
7. See Larry Alexander, Of Two Minds About Law and Minds, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2444, 
2446-47 (1990); Larry Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6 Const. Comrn. 103, 111-12 
(1989). 
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hypointegration) and hyperintegration are both interpretive errors. 
The problem for interpretation, as with Goldilocks and her por-
ridge, is to find the level of textual integration that is "just right." 
Tribe and Dorf offer us no algorithm. The question is, have they 
offered us anything more than a truism? 
The second part of Tribe and Dorf's book deals with the prob-
lem of the proper level of generality at which to define "fundamen-
tal rights" or the "traditions" from which those rights are to be 
derived. The academic reader will be quite familiar with the moves 
here: a right will appear to be fundamental or not depending upon 
how abstractly it is formulated; a practice will be part of a tradition 
depending upon which facts about it, and what level of generality of 
description, one selects as constitutive of the practice. Tribe and 
Dorf apply this familiar critique to the Supreme Court opinions in 
Michael H v. Gerald D.s and the question of the constitutional sta-
tus of parental rights of a biological father vis-a-vis his child born 
while the mother was married to another man. 
After exposing the arbitrariness of any stipulated definition of a 
tradition and the fundamental rights within that tradition, Tribe 
and Dorf offer us a solution to the problem they address: the 
method of interpolation and extrapolation. A court should begin 
with existing authoritative texts and precedents and, guided by 
moral principles, interpolate broader, underlying principles from 
these beginning points. The court should then extrapolate from 
these underlying principles to the result in the case before it. 
Simple, right? So simple that there must be a catch. And, of 
course, there is. No matter how numerous, authoritative texts and 
precedents will always underdetermine the set of political/moral 
principles that might justify them. That is apparently why Tribe 
and Dorf urge that the inference from text and precedents to more 
general principles be guided by (presumably correct) moral princi-
ples. The inference-guiding principles select a unique set of princi-
ples underlying text and precedents from the indefinite number of 
such sets otherwise consistent with text and precedents. 
But here's the problem. If correct political/moral principles 
guide our inference from text and precedents to underlying princi-
ples, won't they always guide the inference to themselves? In other 
words, won't correct political/moral principles always urge their 
own adoption and never the adoption of (by hypothesis) incorrect 
political/moral principles, no matter how well the latter "fit" ex-
isting texts and precedents? 
8. 491 u.s. 110 (1989). 
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That is what I believe and have so argued elsewhere.9 The 
same point can be made from a different angle, one that denies that 
incorrect moral principles are stable normative entities to which we 
could coherently adhere. Consider in this regard the distinction be-
tween rules and principles as ideal norm types.w Rules are posited 
by specific persons and have canonical formulations. They are in-
terpretable without regard to one's values or agreement with the 
rules. A stop sign is a paradigmatic rule in this respect, since its 
meaning will be the same for both Marxists and monarchists, and 
for those who disagree as well as those who agree with its location. 
I am not arguing that the interpretation of rules is ever completely 
value free, but only that as a norm becomes more rule-like, the 
more impervious its interpretation will be to value differences 
among interpreters. II 
Principles, on the other hand, differ from rules on all these 
dimensions. They are not posited. They have no canonical formu-
lation. And their interpretation will vary according to the values of 
the interpreters. (Marxists and monarchists will differ over the con-
duct demanded of the "reasonable" person or over what compensa-
tion is "just.") While rules, even if incorrect from a morally ideal 
standpoint, serve the rule-of-law values of predictability and official-
monitoring, principles do not. Their only moral virtue is 
correctness.12 
Construing a norm as a correct rule or alternatively as a cor-
rect principle obviously presents no conceptual or moral difficulty. 
The same is true of incorrect rules. Although we may believe a 
particular rule--say, a stop sign, a four-year term for presidents, or 
a sixty-day period for answering complaints-is morally inferior to 
an alternative rule, we have no difficulty understanding what it re-
quires, and we may also conclude that its rule-of-law virtues mor-
ally outweigh its other moral defects. 
Incorrect principles are a different story altogether. They pos-
sess neither moral correctness nor rule-of-law virtues. Moreover, 
given these moral deficiencies, plus their lack of canonical formula-
tion and their independence from specific persons and acts of posit-
ing, it is not clear how one can even argue coherently over what 
9. See Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in 
Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 Law & Philosophy 419, 427-31 (1987); Larry Alexander, Con-
strained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 3, 37-42 (1989). 
10. See Larry Alexander, Modem Equal Protection Theon'es: A Meta-theoretical Taxon-
omy and Critique, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 12-14 (1981). See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing 
by the Rules (forthcoming Oxford U. Press). 
II. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules (cited in note 10). 
12. See Alexander, 42 Ohio St. L.J. at 13-16 (cited in note 10). 
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they require. t3 
The upshot of these observations is that there will be a ten-
dency in interpreting a given norm to see it either as a canonical 
rule-and, if one disagrees with it, as a quite narrow rule-or, if one 
sees it as a principle, as a correct principle. Incorrect principles are 
unstable, undesirable, and perhaps incoherent elements that will in-
evitably evolve into rules or correct principles.t4 That is why con-
stitutional theorists like Epsteints and Richards,t6 when they deal 
with constitutional provisions, either construe them as embodi-
ments of broad principles that they independently endorse as time-
lessly correct or construe them as narrow, specific rules that have a 
very particular history. In other words, they relate the positive ele-
ments of the written Constitution-its facticity-to morality by di-
viding constitutional norms into rules traceable to the positive 
elements and principles that are authoritative independently of the 
Constitution (though referred to in certain provisions). 
Dworkin, of course, has built an entire jurisprudential theory 
on the denial of what I have asserted about incorrect moral princi-
ples.t7 He contends that one's political/moral views can be com-
bined with historical materials to produce a set of principles (not 
rules) that one morally rejects but from which one extrapolates "the 
law." But because I deny that one's political/moral views can ever 
lead one to endorse principles that are inconsistent with those 
views, I suspect that the principles that Dworkin finds "fit" with the 
posited, historical legal materials are principles to which he sub-
scribes on purely moral grounds. 
Tribe and Dorf's method of interpolation and extrapolation 
looks to be very similar to Dworkin's, and it is therefore subject to 
the same critique. And if Wellington's public morality turns out to 
be nothing more than morality sans phrase, it too will "combine" 
with language, precedent, structure, and history either to produce 
narrow rules traceable to these facts or correct principles that are 
independently valid and that therefore need not be so anchored. 
There is no other way that the positive, historical law that we have 
willed can be "combined" with what is truly good and just. 
13. See Alexander, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 38-39 (cited in note 9). 
14. See Alexander, 42 Ohio St. L.J. at 15-16 (cited in note 10). 
15. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(Harv. U. Press, 1985). 
16. David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
17. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire chs. 6-7 (Belknap Press, 1986). 
